<<<<< August - 2013 >>>>>
-- CVE-2013-3186 - The case of a one click sandbox escape on IE
MSFT security updates for August 2013
contained a fix for a vulnerability I reported to MSRC some time ago. Behind a some kind cryptic title of "Internet Explorer Process Integrity Level Assignment Vulnerability " hides a 1 click sandbox escape (CVE-2013-3186).
Some context before the vulnerability. IE sandbox, called protected mode, is based on integrity levels where the renderer (where JS runs among other things) runs as Low Integrity level and the main frame runs as Medium Integrity level. They talk to each other through a broker RPC/pipe interface. A process running under Low IL can read almost anything in the system (ACL allowing) but can write to very few locations (TempLow for example). Basically protected mode is tackling the persistance problem of malware exploiting a security vulnerability at the Low IL process.
Find more about integrity levels and IE protected mode here
Then we have the concept of ElevationPolicy
which basically is a list of pairs (program & elevation policy) at the registry (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Low Rights\ElevationPolicy). These are the supported values:
3 - Protected Mode silently launches the broker as a medium integrity process.
2 - Protected Mode prompts the user for permission to launch the process. If permission is granted, the process is launched as a medium integrity process.
1 - Protected Mode silently launches the broker as a low integrity process.
0 - Protected Mode prevents the process from launching.
Basically, if there is an item there with ElevationPolicy 3 the broker will execute that program as Medium IL if requested.
And this is the case for msdt.exe
. Funny thing is that CreateProcess() has a hook inside the LowIL IE process and if you try to CreateProcess("msdt.exe") it will get brokered to the IE Medium IL one and applied the Elevation policy there. Some sanitization happens to most of the parameters for security reasons (do not create a Medium IL process where the process token is too unrestricted, ...)
The vulnerability here is that msdt.exe (that due to its elevation policy will run as medium IL outside of any sandbox) has some interesting command line options
. Concretely this one:
directory | .diagpkg file
| .diagcfg file ----
Specifies the full path to a diagnostic package. If you specify a directory, the directory must contain a diagnostic package. You cannot use the /path parameter in conjunction with the /id, /dci, or /cab
This diagpkg is basically a troubleshooting cab/zip file composed of powershell scripts. msdt.exe initially will show an initial dialog with attacker controlled strings from the cab file (hello social engineering) and once the user clicks the continue button one of the attacker controlled powershell scripts will get executed (again as medium). Voila, sandbox escaped...
Couple of things worth mentioning:
- Cab file has to be signed, but this just costs a couple of hundred dollars.
- After the fix ElevationPolicy is still 3 for msdt.exe and I was told the fix is in the broker... but I have not checked
Fermin J. Serna - @fjserna